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f n the last few years Australian corporate law has been significantly reformed. The I reforms include:
• increased duties imposed upon company directors;
• regulation of transactions between public companies and their related parties;
• increased disclosure requirements for public companies;
• new liability upon parent companies where a subsidiary trades while it is insolvent and heightened liability upon directors for the insolvent trading of their compa nies;
• a wider definition of insider trading; and
• increased regulation of public unit trusts.
Tliis article evaluates some of these reforms in the light of a range of current theories of the corporation.
Two Theories of the Corporation
Recent debates about corporate law focus mainly on two contrasting theories of the corporation: the managerialist (or institutionalist) theory and the contractual theory (Symposium, 1989; Macey, 1993) . The theories have different implications for cor porate law and therefore corporate law reform. They are both concerned with corpo rate governance; in particular, they both endeavour to formulate ways to ensure that the managers of companies act in the interests of shareholders. But they differ fun damentally on how this objective is to be accomplished. The managerialist theory of the corporation emphasises corporate management and the power that it wields. The issue is whether management holds and exercises this flower legitimately (Bratton, 1989 (Bratton, :1476 . Critics of management argue that man-
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agers often exercise power without accountability to shareholders; in public compa nies, shareholders are unable to monitor effectively the managers of their companies, so that legal intervention is needed to protect the interests of shareholders.
In the managerialist theory, accountability is secured by the imposition of manda tory legal duties upon directors and other officers. These include the duties to act honestly, to exercise care and diligence, not to make improper use of information ac quired by virtue of being an officer of the company, and not to make improper use of position as an officer of the company (see s.232 of the Corporations I^aw ). In addi tion, corporate managers are subject to disclosure obligations. These obligations ap ply generally (for example, where a director has a personal interest in a matter that is before the board of directors -ss.231 and 232A of the Corporations Law) and in specific contexts such as where the company is raising capital from investors (Chapter 7 of the Corporations Law). These legal duties and obligations may be enforced by the company itself (where the duties are owed to the company rather than to individ ual shareholders), by shareholders, or by the Australian Securities Commission.
In contrast, the contractual theory of the corporation emphasises the role of mar ket forces, rather than legal rules alone, in aligning the interests of corporate managers and shareholders. The theory is based upon the works of Coase (1937) , Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Fama (1980) . According to the contractual theory, competitive markets are more important than mandatory legal mles in providing managers with appropriate incentives to maximise shareholder wealth. These markets include the product market, the market for corporate control and the managerial labour market. The contractual theory does not imply the absence of legal mles, but asserts that to the extent that market forces require managers to act in the interests of shareholders, there is less need to seek this outcome through mandatory corporate mles.
Clearly, the validity of the contractual theory depends upon the efficiency of the markets. As for products markets, adherents of the theory argue that management must ensure that the company competes effectively in the market for the company's goods and services; but critics stress that product markets may not always be competi tive.
The market for corporate control should similarly discipline management, since any lack of efficiency should be reflected in the company's share price, thus creating an opportunity for a raider to take over the company, install more efficient managers, and thereby realise higher profits. Yet there are limits on the effectiveness of the mar ket for corporate control. Bebchuk (1992) asserts that the market for corporate con trol cannot be relied upon to discourage managers from taking action that increases their wealth at the expense of shareholders. Further, Coffee (1984) argues that the market for corporate control applies only within a limited range. Companies whose management is not inefficient enough to lower the share price to the point at which it attracts a takeover bid, and companies that are so inefficient that takeovers are de terred by the risks involved, fall outside this range. The market for corporate control may represent only a weak discipline on such companies. T he managerial labour market should operate to discipline management, since any reduction in shareholder value due to management inefficiency may reduce the employment opportunities of managers. However, there is evidence that managers typically face a very small prospect of dismissal. Summarising the results of their study of US companies, Jensen and Murphy (1990:240) claim that 'the data suggests that CEOs bear little risk of being dismissed by their boards of directors. The CEOs in our sample who leave their firms during the thirteen-year sample period hold their jobs an average of over 10 years before leaving, and most leave their position only after reaching normal retirement age'. Yet management turnover will increase in financially distressed companies (Gilson, 1989) .
Since the contractual theory of the corporation relies mainly on market forces to discipline management, it envisages limiting the role of government to providing rules that deter one-off instances of management self-dealing (which cannot be prevented by market forces) and imposing standard-form contracts that reduce the transaction costs of negotiating new contracts.
Additional Liabilities on Directors and Managers
A prominent feature of recent corporate law reforms in Australia is the additional li ability they impose upon directors or managers (see Redmond, 1992 , for more de tailed discussion). Two examples concern financial benefits to related parties of pub lic companies and continuous disclosure obligations.
Detailed amendments to the Corporations Law designed to regulate financial benefits to related parties of public companies came into operation in February 1994. The express purpose of the amendments is to protect the resources of public com panies and die interests of their shareholders by requiring that, in general, financial benefits to related parties that could diminish or endanger those resources or that could adversely affect those interests be disclosed and approved by shareholders be fore they are given. Any person involved in the contravention of this legislation, in cluding directors of the public company giving the financial benefit, may suffer a pen alty.
Legislative amendments to the Corporations Law relating to continuous disclo sure came into effect in September 1994. Under these amendments, a range of com panies and other investment vehicles that hitherto have not had to comply with the continuous-disclosure requirements of the Australian Stock Exchange will be required to immediately disclose information that is not generally available and that, if it were available, would be expected to have a material effect on the price or value of the company's securities. Any person involved in a contravention of these provisions, including any directors or managers, may be sued for damages by any person who suffers loss because of the contravention.
These two reforms are best understood in the light of the managerialist theory of the corporation. At their core lie issues of management accountability. Their objec tive is to enhance this accountability by increasing the legal obligations upon corporate managers. The managerialist theory also emphasises the need for enhanced monitor ing of managers by shareholders. This too is recognised in the reforms, both of which contain increased disclosure-requirements to shareholders and, in die case of the re lated-party transaction reforms, require approval by shareholders of financial benefits to related parties.
Equivalent reforms in the US, in contrast, reflect die contractual theory of die corporadon. Recent amendments to Delaware corporate law allow Delaware com panies to amend dicir articles of association to eliminate monetary liability of directors to the company and its shareholders for breach of die duty of care. These amend ments have been adopted by many odier states (Bradley & Schipani, 1989) . The re forms emphasise voluntary contracting by shareholders and, by permitting sharehold ers to contract out of what was previously a mandatory duty imposed upon company directors, acknowledge diat diere may be odier means of aligning die interests of di rectors and shareholders dian die imposition of mandatory legal rules.
However, it should be noted that odier dieories have been advanced to explain die introduction of certain changes in corporate law. One of these is public choice dieory, which focuses on die political process conceived as a competition among groups for political influence (Färber & Frickey, 1991) . One of the conclusions of public choice dieory is diat interest groups diat are small, single-minded and wellorganised tend to be more influential dian interest groups widi diverse agendas; as a result, the political process tends to produce laws dial advance die interests of wellorganised interest groups at die expense of weaker ones.
Some of die mandatory disclosure rules imposed upon companies seem consis tent widi public choice dieory. It has been argued diat die main beneficiaries of man datory disclosure requirements in die US have been members of the professional trading community. Mandatory disclosure rules allegedly help diese traders by mak ing it cheaper to obtain, process, and verify information concerning companies. Ac cording to Gilson and Kraakman (1984:641) , diis explains 'die overwhelming support diat die securities industry gave expansion of die disclosure system . . . as well as die generally high esteem in which die industry holds most ISecurities and Exchange Commission! disclosure activities'. Phillips and Zecher (1981:118) also use public choice dieory to explain die expansion of die Securities and Exchange Commission's disclosure requirements:
These [disclosure requirements! are characterised by wealth transfers from investors and corporations for whom die cost is not great on a per capita basis to a relatively small group of processors [of the information!, which includes securities lawyers, accountants, security analysts, and of course die Securities and Exchange Commission's employees. There is insufficient economic in centive by die members of die taxed groups to organise in opposition to this type of regulation.
The Costs of the Reforms
W liedier the Australian reforms succeed in increasing managerial accountability to shareholders remains to be seen. However, some of die costs of the reforms can be calculated. First, there are obvious compliance costs. The related-party transaction reforms require shareholders to vote on a range of financial benefits from public companies to their related parties. The continuous-disclosure reforms will also im pose compliance costs. These costs may have adverse effects on the productivity of Australian companies and, to the extent that foreign companies competing in the same markets as Australian companies do not have to comply with these types of rules, they will affect their competitiveness too.
A second cost, which is related to the first point, turns on the argument that the recent reforms emphasise minimum conformity by company directors with the new obligations rather than the far more important objective of company performance. This argument is summarised in a recent report At some point over the last several years the debate about what boards of di rectors ought to do and be responsible for took a wrong turn. In almost every other area of economic life the debate has been about how various par ticipants can improve the quality and volume of their productive contribu tions. For example, workplace reform, management development and fi nancial deregulation are all about increasing competitiveness and productivity and achieving standards of best practice. In contrast, the debate about direc tors has become preoccupied with criminality, fraud, negligence and mini mum standards. The worry about the rotten apple -and there have been a number -has deflected attention from the main game of wealth creation which is, in turn, the driver of new investment and job creation. . . W hat we are finding is that the board's list of responsibilities is expand ing, and that most of the new activities fall into the conformance rather then performance category. As these activities are added to the board's duties, its agenda becomes increasingly cluttered and pressured. Moreover, many of these new responsibilities are sheeted home to directors personally, so that there is considerable individual incentive to overkill on compliance, even if the cost is less board attention on long-term performance. (Sydney Institute, 1993:1,18) This quotation raises for discussion the critical issue of the circumstances under which the imposition of personal liability upon directors is appropriate. It may be that, in some instances, the costs of imposing personal liability upon directors outweigh the benefits. Interestingly, economic theory has traditionally had little to say about the legal duties imposed upon directors. According to Hart (1993) , this may be because neoclassical theory, which until recendy dominated the economic literature on the corporation, has little or nodiing to say about directors' duties because it operates widi a conflict-free conception of die corporation in which selfless managers act solely in die interests of shareholders. The development of economic theories that recognise diat die interests of shareholders and directors may diverge allows analysis, from an economic perspective, of directors' duties as one possible way in which the costs that arise from diis divergence may be reduced (McEwin, 1992) .
From a law and economics perspective, it is appropriate to impose liability upon directors only where they can control the risks associated with liability and, where ap propriate, can shift this risk to persons who are better bearers of the risk. Otherwise, directors will become risk-averse in their decision-making and fail to maximise share holder wealth. W ith respect to the ability of directors to control the risks associated with their companies, it is important to note that, in the case of directors of public companies, the expectation is not that they will manage the day-to-day business of the company. Rather, the board of directors is expected to monitor management This is recognised in the leading judgment of Justice Rogers where he stated:
The board of a large public corporation cannot manage the corporation's day to day business. That function must by business necessity be left to the cor poration's executives. . . The directors rely on management to manage the corporation. ..
It is of the essence of the responsibilities of directors that they take rea sonable steps to place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the management of the company.
T he main difficulty with imposing additional personal liability upon directors is that dieir inability to diversify or shift this risk makes them inefficient bearers of risk. In vestors of both equity and debt in companies are able to diversify their holdings and thereby minimise the risk associated with investing in any one company. However, directors are much more risk-averse because their human capital is invested in only one company. T i e human capital even of non-executive directors is invested in only a small number of companies and therefore cannot be fully diversified.
One way directors can diversify risk is by obtaining insurance. Recent reforms to the Corporations Law (s.241A) allow companies to pay the premiums for directors and officers' liability insurance. However, the international experience is that even where the law permits directors' and officers' insurance, it may often not be available (Daniels & Hutton, 1993) . This point should be pondered by those who believe that imposing additional liabilities upon company directors is the necessary solution to problems in die area of corporate governance.
A final cost of some of the corporate law reforms is that, because they are manda tory rules, they deny shareholders the opportunity to enter into different types of con tracts with corporate mangers. This is a particular problem for legal rules introduced by a national or federal government On the odier hand, regulation introduced by a state government may be superior in facilitating shareholder choice. These issues are discussed in the next section. 
National or State Corporate Regulation?
Australian corporate regulation is essentially a national system of regulation. In this respect, Australian corporate regulation differs significantly from that of some other countries where corporate law is the responsibility of state governments and the legis lation can differ in substantial ways from state to state. If the goal is to facilitate share holder choice, state governments may be better able to achieve it than the national government.
There are of course arguments that favour national regulation of companies. For example, the transaction costs associated with companies doing business can be re duced if they have to deal with uniform national law rather than a series of different state laws. In addition, regulation by the national or federal government may over come die incentive of state governments to externalise costs. This will occur where a state government does not bear all of the costs of action diat it undertakes.
Yet diere are powerful arguments favouring state government regulation of com panies (McEwin, 1990; Ramsay, 1990) . The federal government may be more insen sitive than state governments to die needs of shareholders and other participants in companies. Indeed, it is a fundamental rationale of federalism that governments with different jurisdictions can better satisfy die enormous variety of preferences in society (including the preferences of shareholders).
Another argument favouring state regulation is that a state government has less scope for enacting harmful legislation dian the federal government. This is because the more local die jurisdiction of a government is, die more readily people and busi nesses can move in order to find a more hospitable jurisdiction: in other words, each government serves as a substitute for die others. Again, national regulation of com panies makes it difficult to determine whedier diis regulation is optimal because there is no competition for die provision of corporate regulation. Companies and their shareholders do not have a choice and cannot indicate their preference for alternative regulation by incorporating in another jurisdiction. Finally, allowing regulation by state governments can increase innovation and experimentation as each government com petes to attract business and employment by enacting corporate legislation diat is at tractive to companies and their shareholders.
Federal regulation can indeed stifle commercial innovations. In recent years lim ited partnerships have emerged as an alternative form of financing investment in par ticular projects. Partnerships are subject to state government regulation (each state has its own Partnership Act). However, the federal government intervened in die 1992/93 federal budget to provide that limited partnerships would be taxed in the same way as companies. Prior to this, limited partnerships enjoyed a significant tax advantage over odier business structures such as companies in that they allowed the flow-through of partnership losses to individual partners that could be offset against a partner's other assessable income. The effect of this announcement by the federal government was a substantial decline in the registration of new limited partnerships (Ramsay, 1993) .
Another example concerns partial takeovers. A partial takeover occurs where an attempt is made to gain control of a company by purchasing less than 100 per cent of the voting shares of that company. Partial takeovers used to constitute an important part of the market for corporate control in Australia, at one time accounting for well over 20 per cent of all takeovers undertaken. However, in 1986, the federal govern ment introduced amendments that effectively saw the demise of partial takeovers. The year after the amendment, partial takeovers constituted only 6 per cent of all takeovers and have never constituted more than 5 per cent since (Ramsay, 1992) .
Conclusion
The pace of corporate law reform in Australia has quickened considerably. Much ol die reform is best understood in the light of the managerialist theory of the corpora tion, which emphasises die importance of legal duties and obligations imposed on corporate managers.
Insufficient attention has been paid, however, to die costs of the some of the re forms. These include compliance costs and an emphasis on company directors' compliance widi die new laws at the expense of dieir performance. Additional costs arise because the reforms are mandatory, thus denying shareholders the opportunity to enter into alternative contractual arrangements widi company managers. Corporate governance would perhaps be more effectively reformed by changes that facilitate shareholder choice.
